Mahmud II: The Great Reformer or the ‘Infidel’ Sultan?
An Exploration of Ottoman Reforms in the Long Nineteenth Century- Part III
Last week, I introduced you to Sultan Selim III, whose reign marked the beginning of the Ottoman era of reform. Selim III’s “New Order” initiatives represented a major turning point as the Empire started on a path of “defensive modernization.” They also signaled the direction the Ottomans would take in the long 19th century. His efforts, however, came to a violent end when vested interest groups, the Janissaries being the foremost among them, rebelled against what he was trying to do and dethroned him in 1807.
Following a brief hiatus during the reign of Mustafa IV, the reforms continued when Mahmud II ascended to the throne in 1808. Whereas historians generally depict Selim III as mild and indecisive, his cousin Mahmud II was anything but. He was known as a charismatic and ruthless leader who did not shy away from eliminating his enemies and taking drastic action. It was during his reign that the Ottoman reforms truly took hold and became irreversible.
Although his rule witnessed several key events, such as the Serbian uprising of 1815-1817, the Greek Revolution (or “Revolt” from an Ottoman perspective) of 1821-1827, and a rather disastrous war against Russia in 1828, in this article I will focus on two main themes that defined Mahmud II’s reign– the reassertion of Sultanic authority and the creation of an efficient modern bureaucracy.
Eliminating the Local Notables
The first order of business for Mahmud II to regain and reassert his authority/sovereignty as the Sultan was to deal with the local notables that had their own power bases all over the Empire. In this, he was mostly successful by the 1830s, although he also ran into serious trouble along the way.
In the early years of Mahmud II’s reign, the local notables continued to play important roles in the running of the Ottoman state. Mahmud II was simply not powerful enough to challenge their influence at this early stage. Alemdar Mustafa, for instance, who saved Mahmud II from being killed by Mustafa IV and played a key part in enthroning him as the Sultan, became his first grand vizier.
Having a reformist bent, Alemdar created a military unit like Selim III’s “New Order” troops, called Sekban-i Cedid (a rough translation would be “New Mercenaries.”). He also worked to negotiate a modus operandi between the central government and the local notables. To this end, he invited the warlords to Istanbul. Although some chose to ignore the invitation, many did indeed attend. In the end, they signed a pact called “Sened-i Ittifak” (Deed of Agreement), which made these local dignitaries the guarantors of the Ottoman state interests.
Although some scholars label this document as a proto-constitution, in reality, it was far from representing a constitutional turn in Ottoman history, which was to come much later. Mahmud II, for instance, never signed it since he was determined not to share his power and sovereignty with anyone.1 In fact, once he felt secure enough, he moved in the opposite direction and worked relentlessly to reassert his authority as the Sultan while eliminating any alternative foci of power.
Between 1812 and 1820, Mahmud II was able to get rid of most of the provincial warlords in the Balkans, Anatolia, and northern Syria. The process took longer in Iraq and necessitated the use of considerable force. By the early 1830s, however, the influence of local warlords in Iraq was also broken. Once the notables were eliminated, they were replaced by governors directly appointed from Istanbul, tightening the central government’s control over these regions.
In other parts of the Empire and with other local notables, however, Mahmud II ran into more trouble than he would have preferred. Ali Pasha of Ioannina, who ruled over most of Greece and Albania, for instance, struggled against the imposition of any form of central authority (not surprisingly, he didn’t show up for the Sened-i Ittifak Agreement) and died fighting the Ottoman forces in 1822. In fact, Ali Pasha’s resistance against the Ottoman forces was one of the catalysts of the Greek Revolution of 1821–1827.
Meanwhile in Egypt, Mehmed Ali Pasha, after becoming the governor in 1805, started implementing reforms based on what Selim III had tried to accomplish in Istanbul. As a result, he became powerful enough to defeat the Ottoman armies in 1831 and 1839 and carve out an even larger sphere of influence for himself. Much to his chagrin, Mahmud II was never able to subdue him. In the end, Mehmed Ali Pasha was given the governorship of Egypt for life with hereditary rights in 1841 by Mahmud II’s successor, Sultan Abdulmecid I.
(Mehmed Ali Pasha certainly deserves his own article, which I plan to write later, so I’ll leave his story here for now).
The Final Showdown with the Janissaries
In addition to his (mostly successful) struggle to reestablish central authority in the provinces, the most important step Mahmud II took to reassert his authority was to go against one of the most powerful vested interest groups in Ottoman society—the Janissaries.
The defeats that the Ottoman Empire suffered against Russia (1768 and 1774) and later against Austria and Russia (1787-1792) had already demonstrated that as a fighting force, the Janissaries, once the central pillar of the Ottoman army, had become obsolete. Nevertheless, they wielded a great deal of influence in Ottoman politics and wreaked havoc when their interests were threatened, as was the case with Selim III, against whom they rebelled and finally deposed in 1808.
Mahmud II was a close witness to Selim III’s dethronement and knew that if he wanted his reforms to have even a remote chance of succeeding, he would need to get rid of the Janissaries once and for all. Plus, he had the advantage of being the only surviving male heir of the Ottoman dynasty at this point, following the death of his brother and predecessor, Mustafa IV, who was executed on Mahmud II’s orders during another Janissary revolt in 1808, provoked by the reforms that Alemdar Mustafa set out to implement as Mahmud II’s grand vizier. What this meant was that, unless the Janissaries dared to threaten the very existence of the Ottoman dynasty as a whole, they simply could not depose Mahmud II.2
Nevertheless, Mahmud II did not move in against the Janissaries immediately. He bid his time while building up other parts of the military, including the artillery corps, which, according to Virginia Aksan, had hugely increased in size by 1826.3 Meanwhile, he also tightened his grip on the reins of power and gathered around him a circle of figures who supported his reformist vision to transform the Empire. Finally, Mahmud II also secured the backing of the religious class, known as the ulama, who were known to have joined forces with the Janissaries before and revolted against members of the ruling elite, including the Sultan.
When it came to the Janissary corps itself, Mahmud II appointed men he could trust as commanders to be able to establish more direct control over the troops. In reality, however, these steps produced mixed results in ensuring discipline among the men. It was obvious, however, that what Mahmud II really wanted to do was to get rid of them altogether. And he finally had his chance in 1826.
During the Greek Revolution of 1821-1827, the Jannisaries once again proved themselves to be an unreliable military force to the degree that by late 1824, Mahmud II felt desperate enough to ask his Egyptian governor, Mehmed Ali Pasha, to come to his aid with his new modern army and deal with the rebellion. Therefore, it was no surprise when, at the end of May 1826, Mahmud II, with the backing of the Ottoman political and religious class, proposed a series of reforms for the Janissaries, including the creation of a new squadron called the Eşkincis (a type of cavalrymen) from within the Janissary corps itself.
Not surprisingly, the Janissaries were not too pleased with anything even resembling a change to the status quo, so once the reform edict was read out to them, they did what they always did—they rebelled. This time, however, they were outmaneuvered. Mahmud II, making sure he obtained a fetva from the ulama to gain religious legitimacy for what was to come, especially against a possible public outcry, went against them with full force. On 14 June 1826, the Sultan’s loyal artillery units pretty much destroyed all the Janissaries who had unwisely barricaded themselves in their headquarters in Istanbul, making an easy target for the shells that rained down on them. By the next day, the (in)famous Janissary troops were no more, and the whole saga went down into the annals of Ottoman history as “vak’a-i hayriyye” (Auspicious Incident).
Creating a Modern Army and Bureaucracy
The destruction of the Janissaries, one of the most powerful vested interest groups in the early 19th century Ottoman Empire, freed Mahmud II’s hand and paved the way for him to speed up the reform process. It was a major turning point since, from this moment onwards, the reforms would become permanent and begin to take deep roots within the Ottoman state and society.
The first order of business was the building of a new and modern military, which Mahmud II did with the formation of a new unit known as “Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiye” (Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad). Although their initial performance on the battlefield was questionable, they represented a major break from the past. Moreover, we should note that the establishment of these new troops was important not only because it supplied the Ottoman Empire with a much-needed modern fighting force but also had a ripple effect in leading to radical changes in other spheres of Ottoman life as well, especially and most prominently in education.
To supply the new army with an officer class, for instance, a new Military Academy was founded in 1834. Moreover, Mahmud II ordered the improvement of the engineering schools that had been set up during the reign of Selim III, as well as the founding of a new medical school for army surgeons, which was up and running in 1827. These schools provided the cadets with a European-style education, while parts of the curriculum were in French.
The reforms were not limited to the military. Mahmud II was well aware that for the Ottoman state/government to function properly, it needed an efficient bureaucracy. In this vein, he undertook a major overhaul of the central government. Ministries, based on European models, were established with a clear personnel policy that defined hierarchies and ranks. Moreover, a Council of Ministers was established to coordinate the running of the Empire. Findley captures this transformation aptly when he argues that “The 1830s consequently marked the critical turning point from an old scribal corps, made up of secretaries (katib) who kept records, towards a civil official corps (mülkiye memurları), who implemented policies as well as kept records and actually governed the empire.”4
One of the most important developments of this period that had a long-lasting effect was the establishment of the Translation Office in 1821. Before, the Empire relied on its Greek subjects (the Phanariots) as interlocutors between the Ottoman government and European powers. When the Greek Revolution broke out in 1821, however, the Greeks’ loyalty came under scrutiny, which rendered the old arrangement no longer viable and therefore led to the establishment of a separate translation bureau within the Sublime Porte.
Over the years, the Translation Office, where important works from French and English (among other languages) were translated into Ottoman Turkish, expanded to a great degree, becoming an important division of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry in the late 1830s. It also served as a key training ground for the future bureaucrats and intellectuals of the Empire, some of whom would go on to play leading roles in the Tanzimat (Reorganization) period and beyond, as we will see in the following weeks. Through the language skills they acquired, these figures would come into contact with novel social and political ideas that were prevalent in Europe at the time, including “patriotism” and “constitutionalism,” which they would try to implement within an Ottoman context.5
The Legacy of Mahmud II
Mahmud II died in 1839. In his 31-year reign, he left an indelible mark on Ottoman history. The reforms that had started during Selim III’s time accelerated and took deep roots under his rule. The modernization of the Empire was well underway, and there was no turning back.
In the popular imagination of modern-day Turkey, he left behind a complicated and divided legacy. People with a more secular bent usually hail him as the first great Westernizer, a pre-cursor almost, to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who would go on to do a similar thing in modern Turkey.
The Islamists, on the other hand, perceive him to be too “Western” for their tastes. It is important to note that even during his own day, Mahmud II was known as “the infidel Sultan” by some of his critics. One reason for this was Mahmud II’s preference for a Western style of dress, which began to be adopted after the establishment of his new troops. Moreover, there were other social reasons behind the opposition to him, such as the closing down of the Bektasi religious order after the abolishment of the Janissary corps.6
Today, Islamists in Turkey see him through a similar lens and accuse him of betraying the “true” (read: Muslim) identity of the Ottoman Empire and going down the path of “Westernization.” As a result, they usually choose to ignore him in their selective memorialization of Ottoman history.
With the death of Mahmud II came a major shift in the balance of power. Sultan Abdulmecid I, who succeeded him, was only 16 years old when he ascended the throne. As a result, the reins of power passed on to the hands of the men who were trained in the new schools and who rose up among the ranks of the newly-modernized bureaucracy. Between 1839 and 1876, when another powerful Sultan came to the throne, these bureaucrats would be running the show in the crucial period that came to be known as the Tanzimat (Reorganization).
This is where I will pick up when I continue with the story of Ottoman reforms. In the meantime, please let me know if you have any questions or comments.
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Carter V. Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007, pp.35-36.
Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007, p.36.
Virginia Aksan, The Ottomans 1700-1923: An Empire Besieged, p.153.
Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007, p.41.
For a detailed study of the Translation Office, you can check out Mehmet Darakcioglu, “Ottoman Modernization and the Translation Bureau” in Islamic Ecumene: Comparing Muslim Societies, eds. David S. Powers and Eric Tagliacozzo.
Virginia Aksan, The Ottomans 1700-1923: An Empire Besieged, p.168.
Can’t wait to hear your thoughts on the Siege of Plevna. One of the most interesting single events in history, up there with the Battle of Warsaw (by my read the most decisive battle in history)
Very interesting, it seems like he was as much a reformer as Selim III, but the latter seems to be much more prominent in (English) histories. Perhaps overshadowed by Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt?
Sounds like he left the Ottoman 'core' of Anatolia, Iraq, the levant and southern balkans much more efficiently ruled and better off, and the army more modern and loyal.