Sultan Selim III and the Beginning of the Ottoman Reform Era

An Exploration of Ottoman Reforms in the Long Nineteenth Century- Part II

Sep 08, 2024

Last week, I talked about the decline theory that dominated Ottoman history writing until the 1980s and argued that from the 17^th century onwards the Ottomans deviated from the ideal state model and practices that made them a dominant force in the world, as a result of which they went into a long period of decline, which lasted almost 300 years and ended with the collapse of the Empire at the end of World War I. A new generation of Ottoman historians challenged this narrative from the late 1980s onwards and replaced it with a more subtle understanding that perceived the 17^th and 18^th centuries as a period of crisis and transformation, where the Ottoman Empire managed to successfully adapt to the circumstances that it found itself in and adopt new practices and institutional frameworks.

In this post, I’ll pick up where I left off and first analyze some of the external and internal challenges that the Ottomans found themselves in in the late 1700s. I’ll then introduce you to Selim III, who is generally known as the initiator of the Ottoman period of reforms in the long 19^th century and who brought about a major shift in the Ottoman Empire’s way of thinking and being in the world with the practices he tried to implement during his reign.

So without further ado, let’s dive right in!

As I briefly mentioned in my post last week, by the end of the 18^th century, the Ottoman Empire was facing significant external and internal crises.

The halting of the Ottoman forces at the gates of Vienna by a coalition of the Habsburg Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1683 was followed by a series of military defeats and territory losses that culminated in the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699).

By the 18^th century, however, the Ottoman Empire had another problem to deal with. In addition to the Habsburgs, their “traditional” enemy in Eastern Europe, the Ottomans now had to contend with the growing impact of Russia. In the 18^th century, these two powers came face to face repeatedly, and by the 1770s, it was obvious that the Russian Empire had the upper hand. Between 1768 and 1774, for instance, the Russians dealt one of the heaviest blows to date against the Ottoman Empire. With the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca that was signed in 1774, Russia staked its claim for the Crimean Khanate, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. The Khanate was made independent at first, but then the Russians went ahead and annexed it in 1783, a move that the Ottomans could do nothing but accept in 1784. It was obvious that things were not going well on the military front for the Ottoman Empire.

What proved to be the most serious wake-up call for the Ottomans and pushed them towards taking a long, hard look at the way things were going, however, was Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, which brought about major disruptions to the political, religious, and social structure of the province.1 From the Ottomans’ perspective, it was one thing to lose territory in Eastern Europe, territory that may be labeled (or thought of) as the “fringes” of the Ottoman world. It was a whole other thing, however, not being able to prevent a European power from launching an invasion into the (Muslim) heart of the Empire. In that sense, Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt was also a major challenge to the Ottoman Empire’s and the Ottoman Sultan’s symbolic claim to be the protector of the Muslim community.

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This was not all, though. From the mid-18^th century onwards, the Ottomans had to deal with serious internal issues as well, stemming mainly from challenges provincial warlords started to put forward against the authority of the Sultan. To understand how these challenges came about, we need to step back and talk about what some scholars now call the Ottoman age of decentralization (1600-1800).

As you may recall, one major complaint Ottoman intellectuals had in the 17^th and 18^th centuries was the loss of the Sultan’s absolute authority. What mostly triggered these complaints was the fact that from the late 16^th century onwards the Ottoman Empire transitioned from being an expansionist state to a more bureaucratic one, focused mainly on resource extraction and revenue collection, as Leslie Peirce brilliantly observes in her book The Imperial Harem. One key consequence of this transition was that the Ottoman central government started to rely increasingly on local notables as tax farmers as well as interlocutors between the local population and the central authority.

These provincial tax farmers mostly did not come from the ruling elite, as was generally the case until the mid-17^th century. Over time, however, they started to be awarded governorships and were given official titles within the Ottoman administration, as a result of which they became integrated into the Ottoman echelons of power. From the mid-18^th century onwards, these provincial notables became more and more important for the running of the central government. Not only did they collect taxes as district or provincial governors, but they also financed the Empire’s wars and provisioned the Ottoman army. Meanwhile, as their powers increased, they started to build their own households, modeled on the imperial one in Istanbul and complete with a palace-like mansion, huge retinues, and standing armies.

Effectively then, by the end of the 18^th century, these local notables dominated the politics in provinces all over the Empire. In a sense, they became local dynasties, with hereditary succession as the norm that could challenge the legitimacy and authority of the Sultan in their own localities.

These two themes—a sense of military weakness and a need for reestablishing central control—dominated the thinking of the Ottoman political and cultural elite in their early efforts to reshape and reform the Empire at the end of the 18^th and beginning of the 19^th centuries. Not surprisingly, they preoccupied Selim III as well, when he assumed the throne.

The most common starting point for the story of Ottoman reforms in the long 19th century is the reign of Selim III. It is true that even before him, in the mid-to-late 18^th century, Mustafa III and Abdulhamid I took several steps to improve the Empire’s navy and army, but it was during Selim III’s reign that a full-scale reform of the Empire’s whole military and bureaucratic system, which took its inspiration from the European powers of the time, was first attempted.

Selim III was an interesting figure. Not only was he a dedicated reformer, but he was also a talented musician to the extent that his compositions in classical Turkish music are still played today. He came to the throne in 1789, the same year that the French Revolution started to unfold in France. Selim III had an affinity for Louis XVI, with whom he corresponded secretly as an heir before he became the sultan. It was a rather cruel irony, as historian Aysel Yildiz points out, that while Selim III took the reins of power, the figure he looked up to was dethroned by the revolutionaries in France.2 In fact, it is even more ironic that Selim III would live to experience a similar fate about 17 years later.

The reforms that Selim III tried to implement in his reign are known as “Nizam-i Cedid,” which means “New Order” in Turkish. Initially, this was simply the name that Selim III gave to the new European-style infantry that he formed after the Ottoman defeat against the joint forces of Austria and Russia between 1787 and 1792. Later, though, the name came to represent the new practices that Selim III tried to implement overall.

The New Order troops drilled in the latest military tactics of the time while also having European-style uniforms, both of which drew the ire of the Janissaries, who refused to train and be incorporated into these newly established units. One key fact about these units was that they were financed through their own central treasury. In a sense, we can argue that the New Order troops encapsulated the dual drive of implementing military reforms and moving towards making the government more centralized and efficient. Moreover, Selim III founded the Army Engineering School in 1795 to supply his new military with the much-needed personnel, trained in the newest sciences.

Selim III also tried to expand the central government’s authority in the provinces, although these efforts did not produce any tangible results. What did prove to be a long-lasting step, however, was the establishment of permanent embassies in major European capitals, such as Paris and London. Through these embassies, as Carter Findley points out, the Empire could represent itself directly to Europe while also gaining valuable first-hand knowledge of European states, their institutions, and their societies.

In the end, though, Selim III’s reforms came to a violent end. Some historians continue to argue that he was not strong or decisive enough in dealing with the vested interests in the Empire, which proved to be the downfall of him and his reform project. One such interest group was the Janissaries, who perceived the newly established troops as a threat to their long-lasting dominant position within the Ottoman military and society and finally joined forces with other anti-reform groups in the center and provinces to depose Selim III in 1807. He lived for another 14 months, confined to a room in the palace as a prisoner of his cousin Mustafa IV, who replaced Selim III on the Ottoman throne. When a group of reformist local notables from the Balkans, led by Alemdar (Standard-bearer) Mustafa, made a move to restore the deposed sultan, Mustafa IV ordered Selim III’s execution and he died in 1808.

Although it was short-lived, Selim III’s reform project proved to be a major turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire. It represented a radical break from the past or the old way of doing things. As Findley points out, “the mere thought that the old order, which ran on custom and routine, should be replaced by a new order based on plans and regulations crystallized the difference between the reform era and times past.” In a sense, Selim III’s reforms “marked the Ottoman turn towards rationalization that is the essence of modernity.”3 He may have been killed, but his ideas would carry on.

In fact, when he was a prisoner of Mustafa IV in the palace, Selim III was not alone. He had his cousin (and Mustafa IV’s brother) Mahmud with him. When Mustafa IV ordered the execution of Selim III, he wanted his brother Mahmud killed, too, so that he could be the only possible contender for the throne. By pure chance, however, and through the aid of a palace servant, Cevri, who threw hot coals in the eyes of men who came to kill him, Mahmud escaped. When Alemdar Mustafa burst into the palace to restore Selim III to the throne, he found him dead. Mahmud, however, was alive, and when Mustafa IV was deposed, he assumed the throne as Mahmud II.

Just like Selim III, Mahmud II knew that for the Empire to survive, it needed to reform. Unlike Selim III, however, he learned his lessons and was determined to finish what Selim III started.

I’ll continue with Mahmud II’s rather fascinating story next week. Meanwhile, please let me know if you have any questions or comments.

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