Reminds me of “the fall of the Roman Empire” myth that overlooked its continuation through the Byzantine Empire for nearly a millennium. I suspect that elements of the Romano-Byzantine tradition survived the Ottoman conquest, too.
Yes, the Ottomans adopted a lot of their institutional frameworks from the Byzantines, so that is definitely one way the Romano-Byzantine tradition survived the collapse of the Byzantine Empire.
I read something like: "The end of the 18th century was... [a] difficult period for the Ottomans, where the Empire was facing multi-thronged issues, including a humiliating defeat against Russia in 1774 and Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, as well as serious challenges to the Sultan’s authority coming from local notables all corners of the Empire. There was (yet again) a sense of shock and existential crisis among the political and intellectual elites..."
And I think: Yes, there is often a sense of shock and existential crisis among the political-intellectual élite. But in the 1400s, 1500s, and 1600s the Ottoman Empire quickly squelched uppity local notables, and it were the powers on its borders that had to fear humiliating military defeats as the Ottoman Empire excelled all of its neighbors in its ability to organize resources, mobilize and supply a large well-trained and -disciplined army and navy, and acquire and utilize new military technologies. What is this contrast between the internal and external situation of the Ottoman Empire in the 1500s on the one hand and the 1770-1810 period on the other but what one could correctly call a "relative decline"? Yes, intellectuals paint false and fictional idealized pictures of a glorious ideal past—it is one of the things that they do. But the intellectuals were not wrong in seeing that there were very important and significant things that the Russian Empire of Tsaritsa Ekaterina Velikaya and the First French Republic could do that the Ottoman Empire could not match.
Thank you very much for your insightful comment Brad, I appreciate it.
Yes, it was obvious that some things were not going right. I think some modern scholars even differentiate now between the 17th and 18th centuries and argue that conditions pointed to a "relative decline" as you put it for the 18th century. My point was about how we cannot look at that period wholesale and simply argue that it was obvious that the Ottomans were doomed to fail. They were much more resilient and much more dynamic (as opposed to "static," which was how the Orientalists tended to portray the Ottomans for the period in question) in adapting themselves to new circumstances than was assumed earlier.
Oh yes. The image of the Ottomans as ever becoming in any sense "static"—any sort or Wittfogelian constant water monopoly-empire oriental-despotism unchanging stasis—was never based on anything other than total fantasy. I mean, in 1453 at one end of the Mashriq Mehmet the Conquerer assembles the largest and most disciplined army with the finest artillery park in the world, and in 1505 at the other end of the Mashriq Babur conquers all of north India with the remnants of the army with which he lost his campaign to become Emir of Samarkand, after all. Then the Mashriq was the most lively and successful political-military-cultural civilization humanity had. And it did not stay the same. Not at all!
Comments like these really make my day and help me to keep going. I’m very glad that you found my article helpful. And thank you again for letting me know. It means a lot.
One thing that strikes me is the progressive inability for the ottomans to project force. From 1689 onwards pieces of the empire were either taken from them or left of their own accord. During the 18th century this process accelerated with the collapse of the northern Black Sea, and continued incursions into the balkans by the HRE. By the early 19th century Greece, Egypt and the Maghreb had gone their own way. By the end of ww1 the empire was gone and turkey was having to fight for the borders it has today. At each stage of this retreat the ottomans were outclassed militarily and strategically in a way that was unprecedented. From mehemet 2’s innovations in the siege of Constantinople in the 15 th century to inability to defeat Russia in 1877 despite having better equipment, there seems to have been a fundamental shift in the ability to project force and sustain military operations. Hence the decline narrative.
Hello Paul, thank you for your comment and I'm very sorry about the delayed response.
I think my general point is that it is not very helpful to look at the Ottoman Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries from the perspective/framework of decline. It's too reductionist of a view. It's better to see it as a period of crisis and adaptation. This way, we can get a clearer subtler, and more nuanced understanding of what went on at that time period.
Was Gallipoli part of the decline? The Turks sure kicked the Brits ass. Was the search for oil part of the attack on Turkey? Have there been academics writing about the Decline of the British and French empires?
Reminds me of “the fall of the Roman Empire” myth that overlooked its continuation through the Byzantine Empire for nearly a millennium. I suspect that elements of the Romano-Byzantine tradition survived the Ottoman conquest, too.
Thank you for your comment!
Yes, the Ottomans adopted a lot of their institutional frameworks from the Byzantines, so that is definitely one way the Romano-Byzantine tradition survived the collapse of the Byzantine Empire.
I read something like: "The end of the 18th century was... [a] difficult period for the Ottomans, where the Empire was facing multi-thronged issues, including a humiliating defeat against Russia in 1774 and Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, as well as serious challenges to the Sultan’s authority coming from local notables all corners of the Empire. There was (yet again) a sense of shock and existential crisis among the political and intellectual elites..."
And I think: Yes, there is often a sense of shock and existential crisis among the political-intellectual élite. But in the 1400s, 1500s, and 1600s the Ottoman Empire quickly squelched uppity local notables, and it were the powers on its borders that had to fear humiliating military defeats as the Ottoman Empire excelled all of its neighbors in its ability to organize resources, mobilize and supply a large well-trained and -disciplined army and navy, and acquire and utilize new military technologies. What is this contrast between the internal and external situation of the Ottoman Empire in the 1500s on the one hand and the 1770-1810 period on the other but what one could correctly call a "relative decline"? Yes, intellectuals paint false and fictional idealized pictures of a glorious ideal past—it is one of the things that they do. But the intellectuals were not wrong in seeing that there were very important and significant things that the Russian Empire of Tsaritsa Ekaterina Velikaya and the First French Republic could do that the Ottoman Empire could not match.
Yours,
Brad DeLong
Thank you very much for your insightful comment Brad, I appreciate it.
Yes, it was obvious that some things were not going right. I think some modern scholars even differentiate now between the 17th and 18th centuries and argue that conditions pointed to a "relative decline" as you put it for the 18th century. My point was about how we cannot look at that period wholesale and simply argue that it was obvious that the Ottomans were doomed to fail. They were much more resilient and much more dynamic (as opposed to "static," which was how the Orientalists tended to portray the Ottomans for the period in question) in adapting themselves to new circumstances than was assumed earlier.
Again, thank you very much for your comment!
Oh yes. The image of the Ottomans as ever becoming in any sense "static"—any sort or Wittfogelian constant water monopoly-empire oriental-despotism unchanging stasis—was never based on anything other than total fantasy. I mean, in 1453 at one end of the Mashriq Mehmet the Conquerer assembles the largest and most disciplined army with the finest artillery park in the world, and in 1505 at the other end of the Mashriq Babur conquers all of north India with the remnants of the army with which he lost his campaign to become Emir of Samarkand, after all. Then the Mashriq was the most lively and successful political-military-cultural civilization humanity had. And it did not stay the same. Not at all!
This is an area of history that I’m woefully unschooled in. Thanks for helping me catch up!
Comments like these really make my day and help me to keep going. I’m very glad that you found my article helpful. And thank you again for letting me know. It means a lot.
One thing that strikes me is the progressive inability for the ottomans to project force. From 1689 onwards pieces of the empire were either taken from them or left of their own accord. During the 18th century this process accelerated with the collapse of the northern Black Sea, and continued incursions into the balkans by the HRE. By the early 19th century Greece, Egypt and the Maghreb had gone their own way. By the end of ww1 the empire was gone and turkey was having to fight for the borders it has today. At each stage of this retreat the ottomans were outclassed militarily and strategically in a way that was unprecedented. From mehemet 2’s innovations in the siege of Constantinople in the 15 th century to inability to defeat Russia in 1877 despite having better equipment, there seems to have been a fundamental shift in the ability to project force and sustain military operations. Hence the decline narrative.
I'm not sure I can understand your premise. Is it that the Ottoman Empire did not decline? And anyone who argues it declined is no longer in fashion?
My general reaction to your article is that the current trends in scholarship seem misplaced. Trying to ignore the obvious through a focus on details.
Hello Paul, thank you for your comment and I'm very sorry about the delayed response.
I think my general point is that it is not very helpful to look at the Ottoman Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries from the perspective/framework of decline. It's too reductionist of a view. It's better to see it as a period of crisis and adaptation. This way, we can get a clearer subtler, and more nuanced understanding of what went on at that time period.
Thank you. That is a helpful frame to better learn about the Ottoman Empire. I look forward to reading more of your work.
Thank you Paul, I really appreciate it!
Enlightening! Thank you
Thank you for your comment, and I'm really happy that you found the article useful!
Isn't it inevitable due to colonialism,french revolution?
Was Gallipoli part of the decline? The Turks sure kicked the Brits ass. Was the search for oil part of the attack on Turkey? Have there been academics writing about the Decline of the British and French empires?
Low investment in R&D, and human capital. No meritocracy across ethnic groups in public service (sort of reverse DEI).